U.S. Supreme Court Declines to Review AI-Generated Work Copyright Case, Solidifying "Human Authorship" as a Statutory Requirement

On March 2, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States, by denying a petition for a writ of certiorari, effectively upheld a lower court's ruling, definitively establishing that works generated entirely by artificial intelligence (AI), without human involvement, do not satisfy the "human authorship" requirement of the Copyright Act of 1976 and are therefore ineligible for copyright protection. This decision provides the final judicial interpretation within the U.S. legal system on the issue of copyright for AI-generated content.

The case originated from a sustained legal challenge by computer scientist Stephen Thaler. In 2018, Thaler's self-developed AI system, "DABUS," generated a visual artwork titled "A Recent Entrance to Paradise." Thaler sought to register the work for copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office, listing the AI as the "author," but his application was refused. The Copyright Office maintained that copyright law requires a work to embody the "creative contribution of a human author" and that AI, functioning as a tool, cannot meet this requirement.

In 2023, U.S. District Court Judge Beryl Howell ruled that human authorship is a "bedrock requirement" of copyright protection and that works generated by AI lack a legally recognized "creative mind," thereby denying Thaler's registration application. Thaler appealed this decision to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the Copyright Act does not explicitly exclude AI as an author and that the lower court's interpretation mandating "human creation" unduly restricts technological development.

In 2025, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's ruling. In its decision, the court emphasized that existing law does not extend the category of "author" to non-human entities. It found that the Copyright Office's interpretation requiring "human creation" aligns with the legislative intent and judicial precedent of the Copyright Act of 1976, and that AI, as a tool, cannot substitute for human creative expression.

Following the D.C. Circuit's affirmation, Thaler remained unsatisfied and in October 2025 filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, requesting review of the case. In his petition, he argued that the statutory text of the Copyright Act does not expressly limit authors to natural persons, and that the Copyright Office's expansive interpretation of a "human author" requirement conflicts with the judicial principle that "law should evolve with technological development."

On March 2, 2026, the Supreme Court reviewed the petition and denied it, effectively endorsing the lower court's position. Notably, the Trump administration had previously submitted an amicus brief to the Court, clearly stating that while the Copyright Act does not define "author," the statute implicitly requires "human agency," and non-human entities cannot qualify as copyright authors.

Thaler had contended that the Copyright Act does not explicitly preclude AI from being considered an author and that technological development necessitates adaptive legal interpretation. His legal team stated that the Supreme Court's denial would create a "chilling effect," potentially stifling AI's application in the creative industries. However, the Court's action affirms the principle that copyright law's core purpose is to protect the intellectual fruits of human creators, with AI serving merely as a tool that cannot supplant human expression.

This ruling reaffirms the U.S. judiciary's adherence to the "human authorship" requirement, consistent with its stance in patent law (where AI cannot be listed as an inventor).

Although the Supreme Court did not directly amend the statute, this case highlights the growing tension between existing law and technological advancement. Guidance issued by the U.S. Copyright Office in 2025 further clarifies that only AI-assisted works incorporating "human creative contribution"—such as creative modifications, arrangement, or material prompts of AI-generated content—may be eligible for copyright protection.

Statutory Reference

the Copyright Act of 1976

§102. Subject matter of copyright: In general

(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:

(1) literary works;

(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;

(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;

(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;

(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;

(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;

(7) sound recordings; and

(8) architectural works.

(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.

§105. Subject matter of copyright: United States Government works

Copyright protection under this title does not extend to any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government may own copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.

§107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.

In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall include:

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.