An Australian court recently granted an application by a company called Genetic Technologies of Melbourne for patents on the BRCA1 gene. This ruling has dealt a setback to the gene patent rights Americans fought for in 2013.
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA sequence testing patents held by Myriad Genetics were invalid. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in the opinion: "A naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated." Following the ruling, Myriad's stock price fell by 14%.
The regulations on biological patents differ somewhat between European and American countries, and both differ from China's.
On Determining the Scope of Biological Patent Protection
Regarding the determination of the scope of patent protection, there are two representative theories: the "peripheral claiming doctrine" represented by the United Kingdom and the United States, and the "central claiming doctrine" represented by Germany.
The "peripheral claiming doctrine" holds that the scope of patent protection is determined entirely by the literal content of the claims. Only when the accused infringing act strictly and literally reproduces every technical feature recited in the claim is it deemed to fall within the scope of that claim. Under this model, applicants must draft claims with extreme rigor, without the slightest error.
The "central claiming doctrine" holds that the function of the patent claims is primarily to define what contribution the inventor has made over the prior art, and its purpose is merely to allow the patent office and the public to assess the novelty and inventive step of the invention. Under this model, the requirements for applicants are much more relaxed; the applicant need only reflect the substantive content of the invention in the claims, without needing to weigh every word meticulously.
The above are merely two theories summarized by academia. In practice, the patent systems of the relevant countries may approximate these two theoretical doctrines to a certain extent, but overall, whether in the UK, the US, or Germany, the patent systems implemented are not so extreme. Moreover, the two different patent systems are constantly penetrating and converging with each other.
The formulation and implementation of the European Patent Convention marked the basic achievement of harmonization of patent law in Western Europe.
China's patent system legislation and judicial practice have developed and improved rapidly in a short period. Currently, Chinese courts apply the "all-elements rule" in determining patent infringement, that is, if the accused infringing technical solution contains technical features identical or equivalent to all the technical features recited in the claims, it shall be deemed to fall within the scope of patent protection; if the technical features of the accused infringing technical solution, compared with all the technical features recited in the claims, lack one or more technical features recited in the claims, or one or more technical features are neither identical nor equivalent, it shall be deemed not to fall within the scope of patent protection.
It can be seen that Chinese judicial practice tends toward rigor in the standard for determining patent infringement, which in turn requires applicants to be conscientious and rigorous when drafting claims, and to accurately define the boundaries of the claims.
Biological Patents in the US, Europe, and China Each Have Their Own Characteristics
The U.S. biological patent system has three characteristics.
First, U.S. law has no public order and morals principle.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the U.S. court held that under the American democratic system, courts are not equipped to resolve disputes concerning public order and morals; such disputes should be resolved by Congress or the government, not by the courts.
The "public order and morals" principle is essentially a form of discretionary power granted to judges in civil law countries, under which a judge may make a corresponding negative ruling when a certain right or act violates social public interests or ethical morals. Because the United States follows case law, judges can create new rules as needed, so the "public order and morals" principle appears unnecessary.
Second, the scope of patentable subject matter in the U.S. biological patent system is relatively broad.
In 1972, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) received its first biological patent application and refused to grant a patent on the ground that the patent law did not protect living organisms. However, in the subsequent Diamond v. Chakrabarty (447 U.S. 303, 1980), the justices of the Supreme Court held: "The committee reports accompanying the 1953 Patent Act tell us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to include anything under the sun that is made by man."
Third, the U.S. biological patent system is endowed with necessary flexibility by its case law system.
As noted above, U.S. Supreme Court precedents once greatly broadened the scope of patentable subject matter in the biotechnology field and also greatly promoted the rapid development of U.S. biotechnology. However, in the recent Myriad Genetics gene patent case, the Supreme Court justices rarely ruled unanimously that the genes at issue were not patentable. The shift in U.S. courts' attitude toward gene patent subject matter is so great that it may catch many gene companies off guard and leave them unable to adapt in the short term. The above cases seem to show that, because U.S. biotechnology develops very rapidly, the judiciary needs to comprehensively consider various factors, adapt as circumstances require, and effectively regulate it. The U.S. case law tradition can endow the U.S. biological patent system with the necessary flexibility.
Compared with the U.S. biological patent system, the European biological patent system also has its characteristics.
First, Europe mainly belongs to the civil law system and has detailed statutes (such as the European Patent Convention and the EU Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions), which set relatively strict limits on the scope of patentable subject matter in biotechnology.
Second, because it implements statute law, the European biological patent system cannot respond as promptly and effectively as the United States to rapidly developing biotechnology and economic realities, and thus inevitably has a certain lag.
Third, the public order and morals principle in the European biological patent system grants judges greater discretion. In judicial practice, courts have, through a series of cases, elaborated on this principle so that it becomes rich and concrete, which can to a certain extent remedy the lagging defects of statute law.
By comparison, China's patent system has made considerable progress and improvement in a short period, and patent granting authorities and judicial organs have developed a relatively mature set of rules and institutions. However, China's biotechnology patent protection system is not yet complete, and the provisions of the Patent Law on biotechnology protection still have deficiencies.
First, China currently has no unified law on intellectual property protection for biotechnology; different regulations and rules conflict with one another and lack systematicity and completeness.
Second, China's Patent Law basically draws on the patent laws of Western developed countries, and the legislation failed to fully consider China's actual national conditions.
Third, China is likewise a civil law country. Because existing legislation on biotechnology is either relatively simple or absent, while biotechnology develops very rapidly, if the judiciary cannot, in practice, through a series of precedents, elaborate on relevant principled provisions (such as the public order and morals principle), it will be difficult for the relevant legal provisions to produce their due effect.
Previous
没有了
Comment